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Chapter 1: Conceptualizing Self-Worth
How do we determine the value of ourselves? It is intuitive that our perception of selfworth has an implicit effect on our development as individuals. However, the standalone value of
ourselves, or our perception of it, is not what determines our decisions. Whether we are in a job
interview, an argument with our parents, or a conversation with friends, our behavior does not
depend on the perceived value of ourselves, but that relative to our perceived value of others.
We are essentially fully specific and concretely particular individuals, each with our own
unique abilities, desires, and concerns. Interpersonal interactions are essentially how we express
the understanding of our worth and the desire to preserve it. When we affirm to ourselves that we
are worthy of something or someone, we implicitly compare our self-worth relative to the value
of other entities. Such comparisons are informed not by our determination, but by our value
system informed by our upbringing, education, and societal standards. The comparison of worth
in interpersonal interaction hence constitutes the application of self-worth.
This chapter seeks to define self-worth as a concept. I will start with two intuitive ways to
conceptualize self-worth and illustrate their flaws. I will then build upon the merits of each of the
two intuitive theories to present my definition of self-worth. This definition will serve as the
foundation for my discussion of the effect of gender identity and social institutions on self-worth.

1.1 Intuitive but Incomplete Conceptions of Self-Worth
One way to understand self-worth is the moral relation of a person to themselves with
regard to their own intrinsic worth, which is based on the structure and attunement of an
individual's identity. However, when we apply this definition to interpersonal interactions, we
see that basing our self-worth entirely on our intrinsic moral values, or our identities, is flawed. It
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ignores the extent to which we are embedded in interpersonal relationships. Humans as moral
beings are both separate in their individuality and also connected to other individual selves.
Another way to think about self-worth is related to the Aristotelian ideal of fulfilling
one's occupational purpose: a doctor would consider herself worthy if she is good at her job of
healing and curing. According to this definition of function fulfillment, a surgeon with a perfect
surgical record and low mortality rates would have a higher sense of self-worth than one that is
swamped in malpractice accusations because of her lack of skill or focus. Although being good
at one's job in the professional world is an intuitive and widely applied criterion for how we
judge ourselves, there are two issues with this definition of self-worth.
Firstly, it either restricts the process of self-comparison to a specific occupational
specialization or assumes a hierarchy of worth in occupations that is not accounted for. How can
a surgeon compare her self-worth to someone working outside of the profession, such as a highschool teacher? One can argue that the surgeon would consider herself to be superior because of
the monetary impact she has: her higher salaries justify her perception that her worth is higher
than her counterpart as a high school teacher. Another justification centers around the breadth
and depth of impact. A teacher might consider herself as having more worth because she
influences more people through teaching than a surgeon with narrow expertise through long-hour
surgeries. Meanwhile, the surgeon could argue that she has a higher worth because saving one's
life is a much more profound impact than teaching someone English. The cross-occupational
comparison is not accounted for in the framework of evaluating self-worth based on one's
professional success.
Secondly, occupational success is not confined to the public sphere: Many women across
all races have centered their lives around work in the private sphere within the unit of families.
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Their domestic duties, including keeping the house tidy, raising children, and maintaining
neighborly relationships, were the primary obligations informed by their occupation as
housewives. Even when women work outside of the home, many take pride in being good
mothers by caring for their children or good wives by supporting their husbands. Many women
derive a sense of accomplishment from tending to others, in addition to or in replacement of their
occupational aspirations in the public sphere. As the division between the public and private
sphere is not as clearly defined for women working in- and outside of the household, defining
self-worth simply based on the success in one’s occupation in the public sphere does not seem
fair.
Some may argue that motherly and wifely duties are determined by one’s role in society,
as opposed to their occupations. Then we ought to also ask: what informs our decision about
what to pursue in life? How do we choose to prioritize certain roles over other roles, e.g. our
professional occupations? If one’s career aspirations are determined by our upbringing and selfagency, and how well we fulfill our occupational duties informs our sense of self-worth, the
questions beg: how do we determine what to pursue in the first place? As we are evaluating our
self-worth relative to others in personal interactions, are some aspirations superior to others?
Does what we decide to pursue inform our self-worth? These questions call for an approach to
conceptualize self-worth that encompasses both our intrinsic worth, often informed by our roleappropriate duties, and our functionality as social beings in terms of how well we fulfill our
duties.

1.2 Defining Self-Worth
Derived from the Kantian ideals of self-respect, I will argue that there are two folds to the
definition of self-worth: recognition self-worth and evaluative self-worth.
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Recognition self-worth centers on one's essential nature as a person, which derives from
one’s membership in a certain class, group, or people, social role, or place in a social hierarchy.
Our status in society comes with responsibilities and informs our desires in life. Recognition
self-worth determines what goals we ought to pursue and what abilities we ought to develop in
order to fulfill our goals that would be appropriate for our roles in society. One experiences
increased recognition self-worth when she feels good about herself and/or feels that she is
worthy of something because of parts of her identities. A person feeling good about herself
because of her identity as a woman, a student of Claremont McKenna College, an Asian, or an
American – taking pride in one’s gender, occupation, race, or nationality – would be examples of
experiencing recognition self-worth. The pursuit of this specific kind of self-worth requires
members of society to live by certain standards of worthiness by which they are committed to
judge themselves. In acquiring or boosting recognition self-worth – to feel good based on her
identity – a person would pursue goals and projects that she deems as appropriate for her
identity. If a woman believes that caring for her children is aligned with her identity as a mother,
she will feel good about herself when she spends time reading stories for her baby or providing
advice for her teenager. She will then proactively choose to pursue motherly tasks to gain
recognition self-worth.
Evaluative self-worth rests on an appraisal of oneself in light of the normative selfconception that structures recognition self-worth (Dillon 2003). It is determined by the level to
which we fulfill the goals we determined for ourselves based on our identity in the process of
acquiring recognition self-worth. It centers on our own judgment with regard to whether we are
effective in becoming the kind of person we ought to be. When a person gives back to her
neighborhood, contributes to the campus community, or saves a patient’s life as a surgeon –
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effectively accomplishing her identity-relevant goals – she would receive an elevated sense of
evaluative self-worth. If a woman believes that motherhood is one of the most important aspects
of her identity, she will attain the maximum level of evaluative self-worth if she excels at
motherly tasks. She will then prioritize her ideas of motherly tasks, e.g. spending time with her
children or helping them succeed, over other tasks, e.g. working overtime for a promotion at her
job.
A person can experience an elevated or decreased sense of self-worth on both fronts.
When a person performs tasks that she thinks are not fitting for her identity, no matter the extent,
she would feel bad about herself, indicating repressed levels of recognition self-worth. For
instance, if a man feels that supporting his family is his manly duty but performing housework is
debasing for the male identity, he would feel like less than a man when he helps with household
chores, indicating lower recognition self-worth. When a person executes her role-appropriate
tasks but underperforms – completing them with unsatisfactory outcomes – she would
experience lower evaluative self-worth. For the same man who believes that providing for his
family is a central part of his male identity, he will feel reduced levels of evaluative self-worth
when he works outside of the home but fails to earn a household income.
In determining self-worth, the moral agent involved judges herself according to her own
standards. A person experiences higher levels of recognition self-worth when she performs tasks
she deems as fulfilling for her identity; she experiences higher levels of evaluative self-worth
when she completes her role-appropriate tasks to an extent that is satisfactory for her. In
interpersonal interactions, one also determines her worth relative to others based on her own
value system. External expectations and standards, e.g. societal and parental, are irrelevant until
they are internalized by the moral agent herself.
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The comparative nature of applying self-worth accounts for the difference between my
conceptualization of self-worth and the Katian idea of self-respect. According to Merriam
Webster, self-worth is defined as "a sense of one's own value as a human being," whereas selfrespect refers to "a proper respect for oneself as a human being." The application of self-worth is
relative and depends on one's judgment of others. One determines her self-worth through the two
spectrums of recognition and evaluative self-worth, compares her worth to the agent she interacts
with using her value system, and determines her manners/behaviors based on her relative
standing in worth. In contrast, self-respect is a stand-alone concept that does not depend on one's
judgment of other people: whether or not one has self-respect does not rely on her respect for
person A or her disrespect for person B.
The pursuit of the two-fold self-worth informs our perception of not only our worth but
also what it is relative to others. The tendency to see oneself as good or not quite as valuable as
others constrict our lives, frustrating the quest for self-fulfillment and self-realization (Dillon
1992, 52). As recognition of self-worth heavily relies on what we think is appropriate for our
role/identity, socially defined concepts, such as race and gender, play a central role in our
evaluation of self-worth. The comparative process of applying self-worth in interpersonal
interactions further magnifies the impact of social hierarchy. When we internalize societal ideals
as our own values, the conceptualized superiority of one gender, class, or race over the other
informs our relative judgment. The following chapters seek to extrapolate the impact of gender
identity and patriarchal institutions on the conceptualization of self-worth.
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Chapter 2: The Construction of Gender Identity
As I dwell on the determination of my self-worth, I reflect on my mother’s perception of
her worthiness as being a good mother and wife, and that of my father as being useful to others.
Although both views are simple examples of evaluative self-worth – which is based on the
Aristotelian ideal of a good life as fulfilling one’s function – they serve as a stellar example of
the differences in the perception of self-worth between genders. The male perspective
encompasses impacts on the societal scale, most commonly through his occupation, while the
female perspective focuses on the private unit of family and her impact on specific individuals.
Does gender identities have an impact on a person’s choice on what to pursue in life? If so, does
what we choose to pursue have an impact on our self-worth, in addition to how well we
accomplish those goals?
In incorporating the two-fold definition of self-worth, we seek to understand what
accounts for the widely recognized gendered differences in self-worth perception. In this chapter,
I seek to account for the gendered differences in the perception of self-worth by analyzing the
social construction of gender. I intend to combine the social-constructionist and psychoanalytical approaches of defining gender identities to establish the development of recognition
self-worth for women. I will first use Sally Haslanger to illustrate gender as a social construct
and extrapolate her definition of gender as a social class. I will then incorporate Simone de
Beauvior’s psycho-analytical definition of women as the Other to present how women internalize
the socially defined gender identities and the impact of gender identities on the comparison of
worth in interpersonal interactions. Although all individuals compare themselves to others,
women’s socially defined identities lead society and women themselves to perceive women as
inferior.
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2.1 Epistemology of the Social Construction of Gender
2.1.1 Haslanger on Gender as a Social Construct
What does it mean to be a man or a woman? When we seek to define something, we
ought to first examine the realities that we live in. 102 years after the Nineteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution is ratified, we still contemplate what gender equality entails. 1
When we look at the world we live in, we see that gender inequality prevails in various
aspects of our lives. Wage-wise, a woman typically earns 81.6 cents for every dollar a man earns,
according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data in 2020. Time-wise, she is more likely to be
responsible for unpaid housework in the family unit. During the pandemic, women with children
under age 13 spent around eight hours each day on primary and secondary childcare
responsibilities compared to less than five hours for men, according to U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics' American Time Use Survey Summary in 2021. Occupation-wise, she is more likely to
work in care-taking occupations. The most female-dominated occupation by far is in personal
care, e.g. health care assistants and home-based personal workers – 88% female compared to
12% male – according to International Labor Organization’s data in 2020.
The classification of gender has long been based on the “natural” and “objective”
differences between the genders, which are assumed to be “fixed by nature, and so inevitable,
appropriate, or even good” (Haslanger 2000, 83). Society has built political institutions to justify
the essentialist classifications of gender and accommodate the natural differences between men
and women.

The Nineteenth Amendment recognized women’s right to vote. It states: The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
1

10

Are the gender inequalities we see in today’s world inevitable? If gender is defined by
unchangeable, natural factors, then the categorization and its accommodating institutions that put
women at a disadvantage over men is the only version of reality. If we can prove that this version
of reality is socially constructed, and what is socially constructed cannot be the only plausible
reality, then we can consider a radically revisionary view of the world (85).
What does it mean for gender to be a social construct? Gender is not only concerned with
anatomical differences. Rather, it is a social category whose definition interacts with a broad
network of social relations (87). There are two elements to gender’s interaction with social
relations.
1) “Constitutive construction: Something is constitutively constructed iff in defining it we
must make reference to social factors” (87).
As soon as we step away from the essentialist definition of women based on biological
features, any other definition of femininity or womanhood would be socially constructed, since
we make reference to the relevant social networks for context. When we categorize a person
according to their occupation, e.g. when we call someone a professor, we engage in socially
constructed identities. We define that person according to her being in a category that has its
roots in social relations: the category of professor is not possible without the social network that
provides the division of labor and establishes the institution of a university. Similarly, in
categorizing someone as a wife, we have to make reference to the social network that provides
an institution of marriage (86).
2) “Causal construction: Something is causally constructed iff social factors play a causal
role in bringing it into existence or, to some substantial extent, in its being the way it is” (87).
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Causal construction holds when one argues gender-coded traits in individuals are
influenced by social practices, rather than biology (86). Casual construction is critical in our
understanding of the relationship between gender identities and self-worth: “how we are (even
potentially) described or classified can have a direct impact on our self-understanding and our
actions, because typically these descriptions and classifications bring with them normative
expectations and evaluations” (87). Any sort of classification, such as one’s gender identity,
supplies us with intention: given the classification of being a woman, I can become or avoid
being feminine. It can also function as a justification for behavior: e.g. a woman is rejected from
a job post because of her identity as a woman. The two functions together create a feedback loop
that pushes individuals to regulate their own behavior and hold others accountable in order to
reinforce the division between groups that are on par with the classifications. The standards by
which individuals regulate themselves create a system of attribution and response that is then
internalized by every member of society.
People viewing gender differences as intrinsic and essential is a product of social
construct, as categorized identities 1) create expectations regarding how one’s self and others
ought to behave, and 2) instill justifications that reinforce societal ideals. Haslanger offers a
model for the progress by which gender is socially constructed:
“The ideal of Woman is an externalization of men’s desire (so-called Woman’s Nature is what
men find desirable); this ideal is projected onto individual females and is regarded as intrinsic and
essential to them. Accepting these attributions of Womanhood, individual women then internalize
the norms appropriate to the ideal and aim to conform their behavior to them; and, in general,
behavior towards women is ‘justified’ by reference to this ideal. This, in turn, is responsible for
significant empirical differences between men and women” (93).
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Identity supplying us with both intention and justification for behavior corresponds with
the concept of recognition self-worth. In order to pursue recognition self-worth, one ought to
first understand what constitutes her identity and what responsibilities those elements entail. The
function of identity to serve as justification for behavior facilitates the process of moral agents
internalizing societal values as their own. This function perpetuates institutional ideals to the
individual level, e.g. assigning certain characteristics and duties to gender identities. The primary
means to increase recognition self-worth is to pursue one's role-appropriate responsibilities,
which corresponds to the function of socially constructed identities to create intention. Once
moral agents internalize social ideals, they proactively choose to align their actions to
institutional norms through the pursuit of recognition self-worth and identity's function of
creating intention.

2.1.2 Haslanger on Gender as a Social Class
After establishing gender as a social construct, Haslanger offers her social-constructionist
definition of gender as a social class. Haslanger argues that good theories “are systematic bodies
of knowledge that select from the mass of truths those that address our broader cognitive and
practical demands” (Haslanger 2000, 226). On par with the standards of a good theory,
Hanslanger’s theory of defining gender sets its primary goal as to “identify and explain
persistent inequalities between females and males … [which] includes the concern to identify
how social forces, often under the guise of biological forces, work to perpetuate such
inequalities” (226-227).
There are two primary concerns with providing an explicit definition of gender, which
Hanslanger refers to as the commonality and normativity problem. The commonality is
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concerned with the definition’s scope of applicability. Most intuitively, there is great variance in
cultural context across geography and time: the female experience in the U.S. in 2022 can be
drastically different from that in Imperial China in 1022 BC. The variances in appearance, such
as race and body type, also result in differences in experiences. The overgeneralization of the
female experience might overlook important variances and hence put certain groups in worse
positions. At first glance, women across time and continents might share nothing more than the
intrinsic physical or psychological features of female biologies. However, the goal of
Haslanger’s conceptualization is not to list the empirical commonalities and differences between
females. While she acknowledges their importance, she seeks to develop her theory to be “a tool
in the quest for sexual justice” by incorporating two additional goals/standards (228). In
response, she incorporates the secondary goal for her framework of being “sensitive to both the
similarities and differences among males and females, and the similarities and differences among
individuals in groups demarcated by ‘color’” to account for the intersectionality of race, class,
and gender (226).
The normativity problem centers around the worry of reinforcement: “any definition of
‘what woman is’ is value-laden, and will marginalize certain females, privilege others, and
reinforce current gender norm” (228). If we define women as a group inferior to men, the more
widely accepted that definition is, the more likely it is to help perpetuate more injustices on such
a basis. Women might feel compelled to conform to the provided definition of womanhood and
hence reinforce rather than challenge male dominance. In response, Hanslanger incorporates the
third goal for her framework: to create an account that “will track how gender and race are
implicated in a broad range of social phenomena extending beyond those that obviously concern
sexual or racial difference, e.g., whether art, religion, philosophy, science, or law might be
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‘gendered’ and/or ‘racialized’” (227). A framework that accounts for the implications of
unbalanced gender dynamics on the institutional level would not reinforce but help undermine
the structures of sexual oppression. The two additional goals, combined with her primary goal,
serve to establish a theoretical framework that would offer a negative ideal that challenges the
societal structure rooted in male dominance (240).
Haslanger’s approach centers on the idea that gender is a social class, which addresses
the two concerns. She argues that the female bodily features that suggest her biological role in
reproduction served for society to identify a person as a woman. The observer would then place
that person in social positions of a subordinate nature in multiple dimensions, including the
economic, political, legal, and social spectrums. Her subordination is further motivated and
justified by oppressive social practices. Her conceptualization of the oppression of one group
from another consists of five forms: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural
imperialism, and (systematic) violence (231). While one person could be privileged on one front,
for instance, the privilege in income as a result of higher social class, she could be oppressed on
another, such as lower respect because of her race. Her approach allows the implications of
gender identity to account for individual experiences based on the different kinds of hierarchies
one finds herself in. Her framework also has broader implications for other systematically
oppressed groups, such as the Black experience in contemporary U.S. society.

2.1.3 Haslanger’s Implications for Self-Worth Theories
Haslanger’s definition of womanhood as an oppressed and subordinate social class helps
frame the gender inequalities we see today. Her approach sheds light on how even if women
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have the same legal rights as men, as seen in contemporary society, they are still in a subordinate
position that is constantly reinforced by societal practices.
Womanhood as a social class is crucial in the analysis of self-worth, as the essentialist
nature of one's identity is the cornerstone of recognition self-worth. Recognition self-worth
centers on one's essential nature as a person, which derives from one's membership in a certain
class, group, or people, social role, or place in a social hierarchy. Constructing the female
identity as an inferior social class to males has two implications.
Firstly, for the stand-alone value of self-worth, women would consider themselves to be
in a class that comes with expectations of fewer benefits and rights. As Haslanger argues, women
are confined by the identity of womanhood and the associated duties as a result, which are
defined and reinforced by hierarchical institutions to maintain men as a higher social class with
more status and power. Women’s recognition self-worth is hence constructed under the pretense
that they deserve less than men and they ought to be submissive and inform certain womanly
duties, such as working in the domestic sphere and caring for men’s wellbeing whether or not
they work outside of home. In understanding their essentialist identity as a lower social class,
they proactively choose what to pursue in life based on their identities, using the socially
constructed identity as the source of intention for what they pursue. The inequalities we see in
today’s world in choices in occupation and time-spending are women’s choice to act according
to their identities – an attempt to acquire recognition self-worth – as a result of a social construct
that creates and consistently reinforces a gender identity as a lower social class.
Secondly, women's application of recognition self-worth limits their potential for selfrealization. Oppression occurs when the investment into a relationship is not equal between the
two parties. A woman who internalizes the socially constructed gender identity that considers her
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as a lower social class pursues womanly duties, e.g. caring for her family and her husband, in
order to increase her recognition self-worth. When the man does not have the same expectations
for himself and does not put into the same amount of effort into their relationship, the woman's
input then significantly outweighs the male input, leading to the five forms of oppression
proposed by Haslanger. Additionally, since gender identity as a social class has implications for
how one behaves in various aspects of life, it has more weight than other elements of one's
identity, e.g. occupation. In interpersonal interactions, people weigh their perceived self-worth
against what they think others are worth. In purring recognition self-worth, a woman then could
potentially prioritize tasks that benefit others, including her boyfriend, husband, or children, in
front of those that would benefit her exclusively (or have more benefit for her than for the
beneficiaries of her womanly duties). The prioritization of womanly duties then limits her ability
to realize her potential to develop as a moral agent, e.g. pursuing a passion, leisure time, and
occupational success. The socially constructed gender identity here serves as justification for her
behavior of prioritizing others' interests over herself.
The implication of Haslanger’s construction of gender as a social class has the following
impact:
1. A person is assigned the socially constructed identity “woman.”
2. She is thereby placed into a socially constructed class, “woman.”
3. She is thereby subordinated/oppressed through one or several of Hanslanger’s five
mechanisms of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural
imperialism, and (systematic) violence.
4. She is thereby able to see herself as worthy only of certain goals, limiting her
recognition self-worth through using socially constructed role-appropriate duties
as intentions and justification for behavior.
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2.2 The Internalization of Gender as a Social Construct – A Psychological Analysis
2.2.1 De Beauvoir on Womanhood and Consciousness
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir offers a psychoanalytical approach to
understanding gender identities. Similar to Haslanger, de Beauvoir considers gender differences
to be social instead of biological. De Beauvoir starts constructing her version of gender
relationship by defining the difference between femininity and womanhood. She acknowledges
that there are manifest differences between the two sexes: "clothes, faces, bodies, smiles, gaits,
interests, and occupations" (Beauvoir 1989, 14). Although she recognizes the existence of
biological differences, she believes that biological differences only account for the distinction
between males and females. There is a distinction between femininity and womanhood, as "every
female human being is not necessarily a woman" (13). In her view, females refer solely to
individuals with certain feminine biological features (e.g. ovaries and wombs) whereas women
refer to the feminine identity defined by social views. The same applies to males vs. men.
With the distinction between female and male and between female and women in mind,
de Beauvoir introduces the duality between the One and the Other. De Beauvoir argues that just
as an individual views the world on her own terms and judges everything around her based on
her standards, a group as a whole is also able to view themselves as the default and define other
groups relative to themselves. In this sense, a duality exists in most social relationships – the One
vs. the Other. One group would first establish themselves as the One, which stands for both the
positive and the neutral. They perceive any other group they encounter as the Other – a group
with features that are in some way different from theirs. As the One knows the Other only as a
group in opposition to them, they define the identity of the Other in relation to the One, instead
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of as autonomous beings. Biological features are the most convenient and hence most common
means for a group to establish themselves as the One and to construct the identity of the Other.
De Beauvoir argues that the two are not equal – the Other is constructed to be inferior to
the One – in support of her claim on the artificiality of women’s inferiority. She borrows part of
Hegel’s idea of double consciousness to develop the unbalanced relationship between the One
and the Other. De Beauvoir argues that the consciousness of a group as a whole, similar to that of
an individual, has a “fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness,” and hence
towards the joint consciousness of another group (17). As one group sets themselves up as the
One, they also establish themselves as the sole essential. The One sets the guidelines for how the
Other ought to be perceived and the relationship between the Other and themselves. As the One
has a fundamental drive to dominate, from the One’s perspective, the Other is hence equal to the
inessential or the object that they ought to dominate.
De Beauvoir then argues that gender relationship qualifies for the One vs. the Other
duality to prove that women are constructed to be inferior to men. Males establish themselves as
men – “an absolute human type” – and define women based on their biological differences in
relation to men (15). In defining women’s identity relative to men, men judge women by their
lack of certain qualities. More specifically, women are defined as beings without biological
features unique to men (e.g. penises), instead of beings with feminine reproductive organs (e.g.
ovaries and uteruses). In this line of reasoning, if men are the default group of human beings,
which stands for both positive and neutral, womanhood would represent the negative otherness
or deficiency. Since gender relationship qualifies for the One vs. the Other duality, de Beauvoir
proves that women’s inferiority is not inherent by arguing that men proactively define their Other
– women – in relation to themselves as the inessential and the negative based on their biological
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differences. Her argument supports her conclusion that women are dominated not because they
are inherently inferior, but because women are constructed to be inferior to men.
It is important to note that the group mentality is imposed on individuals through
institutional impact. As social and political institutions perpetuate certain ideals that one group is
superior than another, individual agents internalize those ideas and judge the world according to
these standards. Not every person would consider herself as the One in every scenario. A white
woman will consider herself as the One, the default, with regard to her identity as a white person.
But she will consider herself as the Other, the negative in lack of certain qualities, with regard to
gender.
Why would anyone be content with being the Other? De Beauvoir cites the social
institutions of family and marriage as the basis for women’s long-established position. She
previously argues that the Other is under long-term domination by the One mainly because of
two reasons: 1) “inequality of numbers – the majority imposes its rule upon the minority or
persecutes it;” and 2) “a historical event – [which] resulted in the subjugation of the weaker by
the stronger” (17). Gender relationship is an unconventional application of the One-Other duality
because neither inequality in numbers nor a historical event can explain men’s long-term
domination over women. Why are women dominated by men for most of human existence, even
though they account for half of humanity just as men do? De Beauvoir believes that women’s
subordination throughout history can be explained by women’s own inaction to bring about
change. She cites two reasons for women’s inactions.
Women are unable to change the status quo because of constant reinforcements, which
are embedded into the social hierarchy, hence nearly impossible to remove. Throughout history,
society is organized in a way that prevents women from uniting as one group in opposition to
their dominators – men. Unlike the other Others, women cannot identify the origin of their
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otherness, nor do they share ideological commonalities, such as a universal religion or history.
Since the beginning of time, society has been organized into units of families out of human's
primal nature to reproduce. Familial relations strengthen the alliance between men and women to
the extent that it is stronger than the coalition among women. By organizing in terms of families,
societal rule constantly reinforces the union between men and women through joint economic
responsibility, shared residence, and collective responsibility for their offspring. Social
patriarchy is determined by those in power – in this case men – and forces a woman to be more
closely united to her oppressor than with her fellow women. In this sense, women's shared
identity as the Other, or even as the suppressed, can never be strong enough for them to organize
as one unit against their dominators, let alone to fundamentally change their position as the ones
being dominated.
Even if they become able to initiate change, women are unwilling to change the status
quo because they themselves benefit from being the Other. For women, striving for radical
changes in the social hierarchy could lead to the loss of current privileges, which is related to
their dependency on men. Within a marriage – the way a family and hence society is formed – a
man respects a woman as a wife and a mother. She is treated with less hostility inside of the
home because of their shared interests and responsibilities. Outside of marriage, or when a man
is in conflict with a woman, "his theme will be the existing inequality, and he will even take it as
justification for denying abstract equality" (24). By adhering to the current social structure – to
be married to a man as opposed to being in conflict with men – women experiences less male
hostility. They also enjoy material protection as a result of entering the social contract of
marriage. They are expected to take on fewer breadwinner responsibilities, which further
prevents them from competing with men and experiencing male hostility outside of the
household. Based on the arguments above for lack of action on women's side to bring about
22

changes to the current patriarchy, de Beauvoir concludes that women have long been dominated
by men because 1) the social institution of family units prevents women from organizing to
revolt against men; and 2) the social institution of marriage protects them from male hostility to
some extend.
The key elements for De Beauvoir's argument lie in the relativeness and cohesion in
group thinking. On both the individual and group level, individuals tend to think about
themselves relative to others. For the One, the Other as a group is inferior because of the
subordinate social identities informed by their biological features. It is hard for a man to think of
a single woman as superior to himself on all fronts when the One-Other mode of thinking
constantly reinforced by societal practices deems women as a group as inferior. De Beauvoir's
conceptualization of gender as a socially constructed identity, centered around the One-Other
framework, correlates with Haslanger's definition of gender as a social class. The two definitions
of gender identity from Haslanger and De Beauvoir combined explain the persisting inequalities
between genders we see today.
De Beauvoir's analysis of the psychological aspect of consciousness also sheds light on
the human psychology of value determination. We determine our values relative to whom we
engage with. When the female gender identity is constructed to be subordinate and inferior to
men, it informs how women value themselves and their decisions in life pursuits. Her analysis on
women's constructed inferiority adds strength to the claim that women are likely to prioritize
tasks that would benefit other agents, including her husbands and children, in pursuing
recognition self-worth. As they 1) unconsciously see themselves as the Other – lacking positive
qualities, inferior to their male counterparts, and serving at male pleasure, and 2) internalize the
womanly duties constructed and perpetuated by social institutions based on the skewed gender
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ideals to maintain male superiority, their pursuit of recognition self-worth would, in fact, limit
their development as independent moral agents.

2.2.2 The Development of the Feminine Psychology
De Beauvoir argues that womanhood is an artificial identity constructed in the context of
social patriarchy; to “become” a woman, an individual must “share in that mysterious and
threatened reality known as femininity” (13). De Beauvoir’s psychoanalytical analysis on the
mother-daughter relationship sheds light on how a girl comes to internalize societal standards
forced upon them from a young age.
In a traditionally gendered household with the father as breadwinner, the socially
constructed identity as the Other is constantly reinforced throughout a girl’s formative years by
the social relations around her so that she internalizes such identity. As a child in a heterosexual
household where the father is the provider, the mother holds an inferior economic position in the
family.
Her mother serves a vital role in forming her consciousness. Most mothers view their
daughters as a double of themselves. Therefore, there are two ways a woman can approach the
mother-daughter relationship: she either “hopes to compensate for her inferiority by making a
superior creature out of one whom she regards as her double;” alternatively, she “tends to inflict
upon her the disadvantages from which she has suffered” (496-497). As the daughter ages, the
latter part of the mother’s approach will increasingly prevail because of the conflicts the two
women have. On one hand, the daughter wishes to claim independence from her mother, which
leaves the mother 1) jealous of the possibilities faced by her daughter and 2) furious over
renouncing her privilege and her authority over another human being. A woman can only find
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the pleasure of feeling absolutely superior, in a way that a man feels towards a woman, in her
children, especially her daughters (497). On the other hand, the mother does not want her
daughter to replace her in the family. Once the daughter can perform housework as well as an
adult, the father or the other men in the family might consider the daughter to be fit for the
womanly tasks of housework. Such recognition debases the mother’s understanding of her own
consciousness and value, showing her that her value to others is recognized through the general
and mundane function of housework, which makes her replaceable.
The implicit hostility from the mother will lead the daughter to consider her mother as a
rival. Throughout a girl's life, her mother strives to please her husband by performing the tasks of
a housekeeper, keeping an attractive appearance, and sometimes using her daughter or her other
children to keep her husband at home. Consequently, the young girl views her father as the head
of the household and identifies him as the object of her pleasing, as inspired by her mother's
constant efforts to please. The concept of dependency on men is constantly reinforced by her
household structure and the superiority her male counterparts have over her. She becomes to
associate femininity with appealing to men when she sees that all the privileges she and the other
women in her family have are because of their relationship with men. The girl witnesses the
challenges women face in the public sphere in competing with men and that in the private sphere
in appealing to men. The public institutions and private organizations of the family lead young
women to consider their self-worth in relation to their appeal or usefulness to men. She not only
internalizes her inferior identity as an Other but also infers the practical implications of her
otherness: appealing to men is a task that she cannot avoid in life and hence becomes an essential
element of her femininity. In all spheres of life, her function as a woman will always be partially
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focused on serving the interests of men, as it is the primary way for her to acquire socially
recognizable things in life.

2.2.3 De Beauvoir’s Implications for Self-Worth Theories
Haslanger provides us with the framework for understanding the effects of gender as a
social construct on women's self-worth. Women are taught by societal standards and social
institutions to consider themselves as a lower social class. In pursuing recognition self-worth,
they form an idea about what to pursue in life based on a standard forced upon them by society.
The psychological impact of the constructed gender identity from De Beauvoir sheds
light on the process in which women internalize those societal standards forced upon them from
a young age. Through the One-Other mentality, women internalize that men inherently have
more power in society because of their monetary means and assertiveness. More importantly,
men have more power over women. Women long thought that men are more suited for
occupational pursuits in history. As society progresses, many of us still think that men are more
suited at least for certain occupations. Many fields are still dominated by men, primarily because
of the pursuit of recognition self-worth by both genders, which is informed by what pursuits in
life would be role-appropriate. Within male-dominated fields, women are often paid less. Most
women do not take the situation for granted, but they fail to challenge the dominant status of
men. In challenging male domination of an industry or unequal treatment, a woman works
against her socially defined identity as a woman, which would lower her recognition self-worth.
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2.3 Chapter Conclusion
Derived from works by Sally Haslanger and Simone de Beauvoir, Chapter 2 established
gender as a social construct and explored how women come to internalize those constructed
ideas. It points to the role of social institutions, including family and marriage, in perpetuating
the social construct.
The central conclusion is that because of the way gender is constructed, women limit
their potential for self-fulfillment by pursuing recognition self-worth. Gender has been defined in
such a skewed way that it requires women to put others in front of themselves, in order to make
themselves feel good about themselves as women.
The exploitation of one group by another occurs when there is a difference in
expectations. The underlying cause for oppression is the unequal expectation for men and
women. Women are obligated to care for their family members and even prioritize family
interests over their own, while men are expected to be independent and not to show emotion. The
male identity is socially constructed not to put anyone else's interest in front of their own. In
striving for independence, financial success, and prioritizing their well-being, they are acting in
accordance with identity and will experience boosted recognition-worth. In contrast, these goals
are not appropriate for the female identity, which would reduce recognition self-worth for
women. A woman has to struggle between pursuing her self-interest and her self-worth, which is
a grave injustice.
My argument is not that every individual woman views herself as a lower social class or
as absolutely inferior to men. These ideas might not sit right with a lot of people from all gender
identities, including many readers of this paper. People can get past what they intuitively know
or are explicitly taught through education and personal reflections.
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However, the central argument is on the role and function of institutions. We started the
definition of gender by examining the reality that we live in. The female identity as an oppressed
social class and the inferior Other explain the persisting gender inequalities we see today, backed
up by empirical data. Social institutions are built upon these oppressive ideas and constantly
perpetuate and reinforce male dominance. The maintenance of these ideas by societal institutions
– political and social – is cause for alarm. As the next chapter progresses, the paper would
extrapolate the impact of the social institution of family in preventing women to act and
informing their evaluative self-worth.
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Chapter 3: Role of the Family
Growing up, I thought I had the perfect mother. In addition to holding a full-time job, she
offered me constant companionship, took care of me physically, and gave me unlimited
emotional support. In thinking about any woman as a perfect mother or wife, we fall into the trap
of evaluating someone in terms of how well she fulfills the functions associated with her familial
role. In the previous chapter, Simone de Beauvoir cited the organization in family units as the
core reason for women’s inability and unwillingness to change gender dynamics.
In this chapter, I will first demonstrate the harms of the public-private dichotomy in
obscuring the cyclical nature of gender inequalities using Susan Moller Okin, hence proving the
broader political harms to women as a group. Moving onto the individual level, I will further
prove how the unequal division of housework affects the political standing of a woman with
another aspect of Okin’s work.
I will then move on to the analysis of how family units, with their organization and
division of labor based on gender, lead to the perception of lower self-worth for women. The
evaluation of self-worth here is assumed to be two-fold: we evaluate the worth of an individual,
including ourselves, through an inherent element of worth associated with one’s identity and how
well one fulfills the functions ascribed to her role, either in the public or private sphere. I will use
Simone de Beauvoir to argue that the patriarchal organization of a family unit also cast
significant psychological harm to a woman, as the ascribed roles have an intrinsically lower
value. In fulfilling the patriarchally defined functions as a mother and a wife, her sense of selfworth would be oppressed. I will then argue that the duties or functions assigned to women with
the family can also be considered inferior, hence lowering the second element of her self-worth.
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3.1 Effects on the Maintenance of Constructed Gender Identities
There are two fundamental assumptions for this analysis: the existence of a public-private
dichotomy and the definition of success based on economic success. The dichotomy between the
public and the private sphere is a core element of liberal thoughts that makes intuitive sense. The
public sphere refers to the “world of political life and the marketplace,” whereas the private
sphere features the family and refers to the “domestic world of family life and personal relations”
(Okin 1989, 111). Additionally, societies around the world, despite varying cultural contexts
(e.g. U.S. vs. China) and market structures (controlled economy vs. capitalist economy), have an
emphasis on economic success as the criteria for success. Just as one’s income and net worth
have a significant effect on her social standing, role in society, and power, they also have effects
on individuals within the unit of a family. The target of the analysis would be focused on
heterosexual couples with dynamics primarily defined by sex-differentiated marital
responsibilities.

3.1.1 Societal Harms from Public-Private Dichotomy
The public-private dichotomy is concerned with a woman’s work outside the home and
their economic power as a result. When human capital theorists analyze women’s participation in
the labor force with voluntary choice as the sole basis for their decisions, they ignore the power
differentials within the family (Okin 1989, 147). The organization of society in family units
prevents women from viewing men – their husbands – as adversaries, as stated in Chapter 1. The
purpose of the family unit is to unite the interests of a heterosexual couple and their offspring,
prompting every member within the family to focus on the aggregate good of the family.
However, underneath the surface of a united front, each individual is assigned a role and certain
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duties. Therefore, there is potential for the oppression of one over the other even within the
family unit, as “where there are distributions, whether of responsibilities, rights, favors, goods, or
power, there is potential for justice and injustice” (114).
Traditionally, men are assigned the role of the provider, whereas the wife is often the
primary caretaker. The assigned roles have a strong influence on what husbands and wives think
and how they behave (141). The assignment of men as the provider constantly reinforces the
domination of men in marriage. They have considerable power in making decisions for the
family unit as a whole and on the decisions made by each member within the family. Their
economic superiority gives them the power to view the question of whether a wife works solely
based on a cost-benefit analysis featuring the family’s aggregate costs and benefits, instead of
that for the woman alone (147). Okin proves that the traditional patriarchal conception still very
much dictates how people behave today by citing a survey from Blumstein and Schwartz: 34%
of husbands and 25% of wives do not think that couples should share the responsibility of
breadwinning, whereas the numbers rise to 64% and 60% when asked if wives should work with
small children at home (141). The label of “provider” reinforces patriarchal domination by
granting men greater ability to enforce their wills in the private sphere (141, 153).
In viewing the aggregate good of the family, human capital theorists often overlook three
important elements (147).
1) The independent interest of each individual within the family. When the wife
stays at home to take care of the family, the children might benefit from quality
care and the husband from less domestic duties. Even though the aggregated
effects for the family unit is positive, the independent interest in career
advancement, human contact, and self-fulfillment from contributing to society
from the woman as an independent being is ignored or underestimated.
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2) The influence from income differentials. Even though the wages any family
member earns could benefit all members, the earning power of each individual
has an effect on her decision-making power on expenditures and leisure.
3) The potential for the abuse of power. With the previous two points, the one with
higher earning capabilities might be motivated to abuse her power to secure more
benefits for herself individually by exploiting the other members, sometimes even
in the name of the aggregate good for the family unit.
The organization of society in family units unites the interests of each family member.
However, they also leave room for the oppression of one over the others. Benefit for one does
not always lead to benefits for other members. The gendered division of familial roles, together
with the public-private dichotomy of society, perpetuates women's constructed identity as
inferior to their male counterparts. The male breadwinner role gives him the power to undermine
a woman's decision-making power and benefits in the family, which leads to less potential for
her to pursue economic opportunities to change the situation. The unequal power relations
pervade in both family and the workplace and the two form a cyclical relationship to reinforce
each other (147). Conclusively, the division of labor within gender-structured family units
"raises both practical and psychological barriers against women in all the other spheres of life"
(111).

3.1.2 Individual Harms from Unequal Division of Housework in Private Sphere
To further explain the role of the family unit, Susan Moller Okin develops an argument
on the harmful effects of unpaid housework that is disproportionately distributed to women. Okin
analyzes the harms of the unequal distribution of housework on women from two axes: quantity
and quality. She argues that predominantly houseworking wives are likely to work the same
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hours as their husbands in terms of quantity, especially in the early years of child-rearing (150).
In families where both husbands and wives work full-time, women work more hours and
perform a higher proportion of unpaid labor than their male counterparts (154). Furthermore, the
qualitative features of housework put wives at an even more disadvantageous position.
Compared to other jobs, housework is boring and unpleasant, has highly unscheduled work
hours, and provides little to no exit options (151).
Despite having quantitatively and qualitatively disadvantageous features, domestic labor
is also defined by the lack of pay. Housework consists of both chores and “the nurturance and
socialization of the next generation of citizens” (151). As measured by the two-fold metrics,
housework requires just as much, if not more, physical and intellectual input in terms of both
quality and quantity, as compared to other jobs with predominantly male participants.
Meanwhile, men typically have the ability to opt-out of housework at home, as their role as the
provider yields greater ability to enforce their wills. Under the influence of traditional gendered
concepts about the distribution of critical social goods and power imbalance inside of families,
housework has been disproportionately forced onto women and hence become a kind of labor
unique to women. In contemporary society, the standard criteria for judging the value of labor is
by assigning a monetary amount – wages – to the work one performs. Institutional policies and
personal perceptions ignore the value of the woman's input in the household through the lack of
pay for housework. In denying to recognize the value for women's labor input in the private
sphere, our patriarchal society (a) reduces women’s power and influence within the family, (b)
makes women’s social status more dependent on that of their husbands by decreasing their
standing in the workforce, and (c) creates significant harm for women as a group at a larger scale
in the long run (151).
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Just as the injustice women experience at work pushes their occupational aspirations to
be more “domestically oriented,” the unjust treatment they receive for their labor input in
families will result in economic dependency that limits women’s ability to compete in the
workforce with men without domestic obligations (148). Gender imbalance in the workplace and
families perform cyclical interactions to reinforce gender inequality, as "a cycle of power
relations and decisions pervades both family and workplace, and in qualities of each reinforced
those that already exist in the other” (147). The lack of pay for domestic labor and lower pay for
professional labor reinforce the suppression of women in both the public and private sphere,
further elevating men’s standing both at home and at work. Traditional concepts about labor,
including those featuring gendered distribution and view domestic labor as
unproductive/undeserving, have hence become an institutionalized tool to reinforce the
suppressive patriarchy that benefits men.
As Okin argues, women's contribution to domestic labor is not considered as productive
while creating enormous benefits for men. The societal expectations about the primary duties for
households are divided along gender lines, where wives are expected to perform “a range of
unpaid ‘services’ for their husbands” and children (139). The disproportional distribution of
childcare obligations on women affects women’s choice about the extent and field of their
education for the next generation, as family is the primary place of education (142). Okin refers
to a large-scale study that found high school girls are less likely to aspire to the most prestigious
occupations and exhibited lower levels of confidence about attaining their goals compared to
boys (142, 143). The gendered occupational structure also creates disadvantages for women
competing in the workforce with men without many domestic obligations for promotions (148).
In a society where monetary means are the primary criteria for determining one’s value, the
public/private divide and the disproportionate distribution of housework work together to
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undermine women’s valuation of their self-worth and their prospects for achieving their full
potential in life.
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3.2 Effects on the Determinations in Domains of Self-Worth
Chapter 1 detailed the ways we evaluate our self-worth: 1) recognition self-worth:
intrinsic worth associated with our identities and informs the role-appropriate pursuits in life; and
2) evaluative self-worth: acquired self-worth, the extend to which we fulfill our role-appropriate
pursuits in life. Additionally, there is a comparative nature to self-worth: in interacting with
others, we do not think of ourselves as worthy or not on our own. Rather, we reach a conclusion
after comparison with regard to the other entities we are engaging with.
With a gender identity constructed to be inferior to men, the first element of self-worth –
recognition self-worth – which derives from the inherent value associated with her identity, is
lower with respect to that of men. As explained by an analysis of Okin’s work, we can also see
the unequal power dynamics within families, exemplified by a woman’s limited decision-making
power over her individual life due to assigned familial roles based on gender and the decision
metrics focused on the aggregate good for the family unit.
Simone de Beauvoir explores the psychological effects of their role in family units as
mothers on women. As detailed in Chapter 2, women are raised to be feminine throughout the
various stages of their teenage life. They benefit and suffer from their femininity. Societal
constructs constantly reinforce the gendered identities through practices and institutions, which
create disadvantages for women who do not conform to gendered norms. Women who choose to
work compete with men at disadvantaged positions and have less time for appearances because
of their work hours. In comparison to their peers who enjoy the benefits of the spared
competition and more time away from work (even though not necessarily for themselves),
women are prompted not to abandon the feminine aspect of their identity.
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The second major element of self-worth is evaluative self-worth: one’s ability to fulfill
one’s role-appropriate duties. When a woman marries, she is assigned the role of the wife, the
domestic housekeeper responsible for maintaining domestic relationships with other family units.
Once she has a child, she becomes the mother, in addition to her identity as a wife. As women’s
biological features make the propagation of the human species possible, society creates the norm
of considering motherhood as women’s natural vocation. The duties of child rearing, in addition
to the domestic duties detailed by Okin, puts a woman’s fulfillment of her role as a mother in
opposition to her other desires as a person. With such contradiction, societal view, reinforced by
both men and other women around a woman, pressures her to prioritize her more natural role: as
the mother. Even though she fulfills her purpose as a mother and a wife, a woman constantly
finds herself in “a state of nervousness and acrimony,” as her work as a housekeeper does not
have the economically recognizable value in society’s point of view (Beauvoir 1989, 526). For a
woman, the work she does as a housekeeper does not give her salvation, nor does it justify her
existence, even though she is compelled to conform to society’s expectation to be a naturally
good mother. With a woman’s limited economic freedom and her own demand for herself to be a
good mother, “she lacks the means requisite for self-affirmation as an individual; and in
consequence her individuality is not given recognition” (526). From the functional point of view,
even though a woman fulfills her function as a mother well, her perception of her self-worth in
the second regard is still limited, as her duties as a mother contradict her aspirations as an
individual person.
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Chapter 4: Limitations and Response
4.1 Limitations
4.1.1 Women are working
While the first two chapters offer a compelling argument for the female perspective on
self-worth, the analysis is primarily focused on the traditional family structure with men as the
earners and women as domestic caretakers. There is a major flaw in the argument: Most women
are not domestic caretakers. 56.76 percent of women aged 15 and older are actively participating
in the workforce in the U.S. and the percentage can be up to 83.89 percent in developing
countries in Africa, such as Rwanda. Women do go to work and nowadays even more than their
male counterparts. Women now comprise more than half of the U.S. labor force at 50.04 percent
– there are 109,000 more women working than men – as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics in 2020.
However, women are confined to certain occupations and receive less pay. Even though
women are participating in the workforce, they tend to concentrate on certain occupations, which
generally pay less. Compared with men, women are far more concentrated in office and
administrative support jobs. Across all occupational categories, the three most common jobs for
women were registered nurse ($1,240), elementary and middle school teacher ($1,085), and
secretaries and administrative assistants ($777). Collectively, these occupations employed 6.3
million women in 2020, representing 13 percent of women in full-time wage and salary jobs.
Even when women are in the same occupation as men, they face unequal pay, sexual
harassment, and limited access to promotions. Within the professional category, though, the
proportion of women employed in the higher-paying jobs is much smaller than the proportion of
men employed in them. In 2020, 11 percent of women in professional and related occupations
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were employed in the relatively high-paying computer (median weekly earnings of $1,423 for
women and $1,738 for men) and engineering ($1,382 for women and $1,626 for men)
occupations, compared with 48 percent of men.
Among women, race plays a central role in their experiences. Black women are more
likely to work outside of their families. For instance, in 2019, Black women's labor force
participation rate was 60.5% compared with 56.8% for white women, according to the U.S.
Department of Labor. Even in 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, their labor force participation
rate was 58.8%, compared to 56.2% for women overall. They are also more likely to be paid less.
Black women earn 63 cents for every dollar earned by white, non-Hispanic men, whereas white,
non-Hispanic women earn 78.7 cents. Most strikingly, Black women are also more likely to
experience gender-based violence, such as workplace harassment. Black women filed sexual
harassment charges at nearly three times the rate of white, non-Hispanic women and are
disproportionately represented among women who filed sexual harassment charges across all
industries, according to a new National Women's Law Center (NWLC) report that analyzes
sexual harassment charges filed by women in the private sector between 2012 and 2016.
The inadequate assumption that women are primarily domestic caretakers falls apart for
more than half of the women in the U.S., with Black women most actively participating in the
workforce and disproportionately receiving the most amount of unjust treatment and the least
amount of monetary compensation. In this chapter, I will use Kimberle Crenshaw to outline
intersectional identities and injustice as the underlying reason for the differentials across races
shown in empirical data. I will then use Patricia Hill Collins to offer a Black feminist critique for
why the proposed theory on self-worth in chapters 2 and 3 is not applicable to Black women,
featuring the public-private dichotomy.
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4.1.2 Crenshaw on Intersectionality
As empirical data demonstrates, Black women face more difficulties in the workforce as
compared to women of other color and their Black male counterparts. What accounts for the
multilayered injustice they face both as a woman and a Black person? How can we better
understand this phenomenon?
Kimberle Crenshaw provides us with a useful analogy for thinking about identities and
their implications in Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics. She compared
discrimination with traffic accidents at an intersection. Just as a traffic accident “can be caused
by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them,” a Black
woman can be injured by either gender or race discrimination, and sometimes both (Crenshaw
1989, 149). If society or the legal system address injustice towards a Black woman only when
the act can be classified as racial or gender discrimination, it would be the same as calling an
ambulance in a deadly traffic accident only when the responsible party and the level of
responsibility have been correctly identified. Instead of calling an ambulance for the victim only
after the driver responsible for the injuries is identified, our institutions should look at a hurt
person and call the ambulance no matter what.
The traffic accident analogy is an illustration of what has happened in the American
judicial system with regard to injustice toward Black women. In the current judicial system,
Black women can only receive legal relief when they are able to attribute their claim to either
race or sex (but not a combination of both) and receive none when they cannot achieve so.
Crenshaw reconstructed the single-issue framework by citing court precedents featuring Black
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women as plaintiffs. Crenshaw cited DeGraffenreid v General Motors. as the case that denied
Black women’s identity as “a special class to be protected from discrimination” (141). She
argued that the court’s refusal to classify Black women as a specific class of protected minorities
“did not contemplate that Black women could be discriminated against as ‘Black women’ or did
not intend to protect them when such discrimination occurred” (142). DeGraffenreid laid out the
foundational framework for the judicial system to examine cases of discrimination as “a cause of
action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination
of both” (141).
With the conclusion that Black women have to fit into either racial discrimination or
gender discrimination to be protected, Crenshaw used two additional cases to illustrate the
difficulties Black women face in gender and race discrimination cases. In Moore v Hughes
Helicopter, Inc., the court questioned a Black woman’s ability to represent all females, as
“[Moore’s] attempt to specify her race was seen as being at odds with the standard allegation that
the employer simply discriminated ‘against females’” (144). Additionally, the court also
prevented the plaintiff from using data on “overall sex disparity in supervisory and upper-level
labor jobs”, hence drawing a clear distinction between the Black women’s identity and a
woman’s identity in general (148). Crenshaw argues that such a distinction is used to prevent
Black women from restoring their rights, instead of securing their rights. Payne v Travenol is a
case where the court refused to allow the Black women to represent Black males and declined to
extend its ruling to Black males, out of “fear that their conflicting interests would not be
adequately addressed” (147). If Black women 1) can only file a complaint based on either gender
or race discrimination and 2) lack the ability to represent all females (e.g. white females) or all
Black people (e.g. Black males) from the judicial point of view, the judicial system has hence
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become an institutionalized tool to exclude Black women from defending their rights. Sticking to
categorical analyses in the judicial system turns court systems into institutional actors that
completely obscure Black women’s experiences and guarantee that their needs will seldom be
addressed (150). Crenshaw argues that the categorical method of analysis qualifies as a top-down
approach: injustice can only be addressed when it can be classified into a single category that is
defined from a higher level. Her analysis sheds light on the role the legal institutions play in
perpetuating and maintaining racial and gender oppression.

4.1.3 Collins’ Black Feminist Critique
Kimberle Crenshaw’s analysis gives us insight into the intersectional nature of identities
and the injustice that can occur as a result. Black women face injustices both because of their
gender and their race on a day-to-day basis. One of the most important elements of the self-worth
analysis is the assumption that women are expected to work inside of the private home. In order
to pursue recognition self-worth, women proactively choose tasks aligned with their female
identity, which is to focus on taking care of the family. In order to excel at her womanly task, she
will prioritize her family and spend most of her energy and time inside of the household, which
accounts for what we see in the traditionally gendered household.
However, the theory is very much based on what we see in white households in the U.S.
What happens when the woman have to work just for the family to survive financially? Patricia
Hill Collins could offer a Black feminist critique that the public/private divide has problematic
implications for Black women and cannot be applied to them in reality. Black women are more
likely to work outside of their families, especially when we take the injustice Black men face in
finding jobs that can support the whole household into account. They are also more likely to be
put in lower-paying jobs, where the pay gaps persist even when researchers from the U.S.
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Department of Labor control for educational levels. Even though the identity of a woman comes
with certain expectations, they are not the same for Black women. Black women are expected to
take care of their family, husband, and children, but they are also expected to work outside of
home. This implication challenges the impact of the proposed self-worth theory: does the
damaging effects of pursuing recognition and evaluative self-worth for women go away when
women are expected to work outside of the family?
Collins argues that the public/private dichotomy is confined to a traditional family. She
defines a traditional family as 1) being formed through a combination of marital and blood ties,
2) consisting of heterosexual, racially homogeneous couples who produce their own biological
children, and 3) having a specific authority structure with the father earning an adequate family
wage and the mother focusing on care-taking duties (Collins 2000, 47). It is only with a
relatively fixed sexual division of labor, wherein women’s roles are defined as primarily in the
home with men’s in the public world of work, that the separation of work and family exists in the
traditional family.
There are two implications of the traditional family ideal that are problematic for Black
women. First, the assumed split between the "public" sphere of paid employment and the
"private" sphere of unpaid family responsibilities has never worked for U.S. Black women.
Under slavery in the U.S., Black women worked agricultural jobs without pay in the public
sphere and had their family privacy routinely violated. Even with slavery abolished, many Black
women continued to work as domestic workers in non-Black households. More than 150 years
after slavery was abolished, 21 percent of women working as "personal and home care aides" are
Black, according to The Status of Black Women in the U.S. report by the Institute for Women's
Policy Research in 2017. Their duties primarily include household chores and taking care of the
children of their employers. They are supposedly working in the public sector of society as their
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labor benefits individuals outside of their own household. However, they often receive
exploitative pay and experience sexual harassment in the work environment. Since their
workplace is also considered to be somewhat private by the rest of society, they have little power
to defend their rights in what appears to be the public sector for them. Therefore, even in the
public sector, Black women do not share the commonly assumed basic rights in the workforce as
non-Black females and Black males, primarily because of the historical context of slavery and
the resulting occupational focus on domestic labor. Second, the public/private binary separating
the family households from the paid labor market also act as the basis for gender ideology. If
society assumes that real men work and real women take care of families, Black women become
less "feminine," as 1) they work outside the household, 2) their work takes them away from their
children, 3) they compete with men for paying jobs (47).
Collins also argues that the economic reality of Black families makes the public/private
dichotomy inapplicable to Black women. For most Black women who work outside of their
home, their goal is not to achieve economic parity with their Black male counterparts, but to
secure an adequate amount of income to support the household. When Black men cannot find
jobs that would offer them a household income, married Black women are then forced to work
for pay. Even when Black women endure harassment and violation in their jobs, especially in
domestic service, they are unable to do so because of the family’s need for economic support.
In addition to the need for substitutional income, Black women also face limitations in
exiting the exploitative workforce because of the inconsistency in employment for Black men.
Black men employed in low-skilled occupations, such as manufacturing, typically received
wages higher than the wages earned by their wives working in domestic service. However,
because of the competition they receive from White male workers, they face a higher probability
and frequency of being laid off (55). In contrast, even though Black women receive lower wages
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in their domestic service jobs, they are more sustainable in the sense that the wages are more
dependable and predictable. In order to guarantee that a family can survive economically, Black
women are sometimes forced to stay in exploitative jobs because of the difference in pay and
reliability of pay their Black male counterparts face in the job market. When they are forced to
work for pay, they are not in the assumed role of a domestic wife, potentially making the impacts
from a public/private dichotomy inapplicable for Black women.
Even though many Black women are forced to work because of insufficient household
income and consequently face challenges exiting exploitative work environments, they have a
pursuit outside of their household. Chapters two and three extrapolate the harmful effects of
pursuing self-worth in limiting women's potential for self-realization. If women are forced to
work outside of the home, they then 1) have increased voice inside of the home because of their
financial contributions, 2) have the additional element of occupation in their identity, which
could prevent them from being completely consumed by the element of gender identity to some
extend. From Collins' perspective, Black women that work outside of the home ought to be more
protected from the harms of pursuing self-worth than women who conform to gender
expectaction by working primarily inside of the family.
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4.2 Response
4.2.1 Response to the Black Feminist Critique
Contrary to what Collins might argue, the pursuit of self-worth is even more problematic
for Black women because of their intersectional identity. As discussed in Chapter two, the
pursuit of self-worth is problematic for women because their role-appropriate duties can be
contrary to their self-interest. The same line of logic can be applied to other oppressed groups in
society.
Societal expectations, derived from socially constructed identities and perpetuated by
social institutions, create a double consciousness for oppressed groups. In pursuing self-worth,
they need to choose tasks that are appropriate for their socially constructed identities. When
society deems one as unworthy of certain aspirations in life, the agent's decision to pursue these
aspirations needs to develop a value system that is separate from what they are taught. But
through interacting with other social beings around them, which could be strangers or their
family, they are constantly reminded of the socially constructed expectations for their identity.
Stereotypes are a means for society to perpetuate and maintain the dominance of one
group over another. For a white person, going to education is considered appropriate for her
identity. She boosts her social standing and self-worth by effectively completing her education.
However, for a Black person from a low-income community, the decision to go to college can be
a struggle. She has to consider her family's wishes for her to be around her family and contribute
to her local community by getting a job in the area. But she also has established her value system
that education would be beneficial for her own self-interests. Going to college could increase her
self-worth according to her value system, but has the opposite effect in the value system instilled
in her by society, which she has to constantly fight against.
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There are many stereotypes associated with Black people. Even to this day, racial
discrimination assigns the label of having lower intelligence and being suitable for physical labor
to Black people in general. Black women are often considered as sexualized beings – facilitated
by the creation of the hyper-sexual seductress Jezebelle – which makes them more vulnerable to
sexual abuse, assault, and harassment. When they are assigned these negative labels by society,
Black people, especially Black women, struggle with what society expects from them and what
is good for their self-interest. When a Black woman works extra hours for a promotion at work,
she risks being viewed as a bad mother, even when she would provide additional household
income. When she leaves her low-income neighborhood to pursue higher education, she risks
being viewed as betraying community that raised her. When she points out sexual abuse by a
Black man, she risks being viewed as hindering the advancement of the Black community. The
conflict between what is good for one's self-interest and what aligns with her role-appropriate
behaviors is even more intense for a Black woman, as she experiences intersectional oppression
because of both her race and gender. In conclusion, the self-worth theory still applies to Black
women, even when they work outside of the family. Their pursuit of self-worth is even more
problematic because of the additional layer of social expectation based on their race.

4.2.2 Proposal for Solution
Based on the intersectional nature of identities, Crenshaw argues that in order to address
any problem, we ought to first focus on the experience of those who experience intersectional
oppression. Since feminist theories deem Black women as their respective constituent, they need
to take Black women’s intersectional experience into account and abandon the approach of
considering “experiences [as] relevant only when they are related to certain clearly identifiable
causes” (Crenshaw 1989, 166). The same applies to Black liberationist politics; in terms of
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defending the right of a group as a whole, both Black liberationists and contemporary feminists
ought to defend Black women as part of their constituents, instead of excluding them with regard
to the source of their difficulties (166). Therefore, Crenshaw proposes a bottom-up approach to
discrimination, where society’s efforts begin with “addressing the needs and problems of those
who are most disadvantaged and with restructuring and remaking the world where necessary,
then others who are singularly disadvantaged would also benefit” (167).
Following Crenshaw's argument, the solution to the harms of pursuing self-recognition
for women ought to be proposed from the intersectionality perspective. I would argue for
reimagining empathy as a non-gender-binary concept. Empathy has been taught to people of all
genders in society as a womanly trait: women are supposed to be kind and caring, whereas men
are supposed to be composed, logical, and goal-oriented. The ability to care and emphasize
should be universalized across genders. Better ability to emphasize with each other would have
two implications.
Firstly, it would enable a conceptual adjustment to self-worth by incorporating an
additional element of communal impact. Empathy requires people to stop caring exclusively for
themselves and consider the impact of their actions on others. Empathy as a non-gender-binary
concept would create conceptual room for building appraisal self-respect on communal activities
and achievements, thus moving society toward more integrative and mutually supportive social
arrangements. The inclusion of communal impact in evaluating self-worth qualifies as a bottomup approach, since it benefits the intersectionally oppressed groups the most. The racially
privileged need to consider the impact of their actions on the groups that are oppressed based on
their race. When individuals reiterate the idea that Black people have less intellectual capacity or
that Black women are sexualized beings, they ought to consider: what is the communal impact of
my action? What impact does this have on the people around me, in addition to benefits for
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myself? If we help everyone in society internalize that empathy is not gender binary but
universal for all humans, we could incorporate communal impact into the evaluation of selfworth. Everyone ought to consider contributing to a broader community as a means to advancing
recognition self-worth and would want to excel at caring for others in the pursuit of evaluative
self-worth.
Secondly, empathy as a non-gender-binary concept could incorporate domestic duties and
responsibilities as appropriate for the all gender identity, especially for men. Caring for one's
family ought to be a universal concept, instead of one that is designed exclusively for women. In
pursuing recognition self-worth, men would also need to care for the private unit of families.
They ought to take care of more domestic duties in order to pursue recognition self-worth, which
would levy the burden on all women, especially Black women and working women, who need
balance between work and life. Men would also get a higher sense of evaluative self-worth in
excelling at those tasks associated with the domestic sphere.
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